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ABSTRACT 
Although the potential causes and consequences of recent increases in international food prices have 
attracted widespread attention, many existing appraisals are superficial and/or piecemeal. This paper 
attempts to provide a more comprehensive review of these issues based on the best and most recent 
research, and includes fresh theoretical and empirical analysis. We first analyze the causes of the current 
crisis by considering how well standard explanations hold up against relevant economic theory and 
important stylized facts. Some explanations, especially rising oil prices, the depreciation of the US dollar, 
biofuel demand, and some commodity-specific explanations, hold up much better than some others. We 
then provide an appraisal of the likely macro- and microeconomic impacts of the crisis in developing 
countries. We observe a large gap in the effects of macro and micro factors, and note that when these 
factors are used to identify the most vulnerable countries, the results often point in different directions. 
We conclude with a brief discussion of what ought to be learned from this crisis. 
Keywords: food prices, global food crisis, oil prices, biofuels, poverty impacts, macroeconomic 
impacts 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Since 2003, the international prices of a wide range of commodities have surged upwards in dramatic 
fashion, often more than doubling within a few years, in some cases even within a few months. A surge in 
the price of food is of special concern to the world’s poor. Many impoverished people depend upon food 
production for their livelihood, and virtually all poor people spend large portions of their household 
income on food. Sharply rising prices offer few means of substitution and adjustment, especially for the 
urban poor. There are justifiable concerns that this crisis may plunge millions of people into poverty, with 
those who are already poor suffering still more through increased hunger and malnutrition. There are 
equally grave concerns regarding the impacts that food and fuel inflation may have on macroeconomic 
stability and economic growth, given that the first global commodity crisis of 1974 coincided with an end 
to the “Golden Age” of post-war economic growth. Since the current crisis most likely involves a more 
persistent rise in commodity prices, there is considerable uncertainty about how well the world economy 
in general, and developing economies in particular, will be able to effectively respond to these challenges. 
The first objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the potential causes 
of recent food price surges. The second objective is to review the potential consequences on the poor, 
either directly through increased costs of living, or indirectly through changes in macroeconomic 
conditions. We address these objectives by reviewing the most credible and recent literature on the issue,  
augmenting the existing evidence where necessary and feasible (a fuller working paper version of this 
report includes the bulk of this analysis). We also highlight research questions that remain largely 
unanswered, and comment briefly upon the central challenges facing policymakers in the midst of the 
crisis. 2 
 
2.  THE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS 
A wide range of research has attempted to identify the factors that might have caused the recent surge in 
food prices (Abbott et al., 2008; Baltzer et al., 2008; Helbling et al., 2008; Schnepf, 2008; Trostle, 2008; 
von Braun, 2008), but only one paper to date has attempted to add explicit orders of magnitude to 
different factors (Mitchell, 2008). In this section we review, reassess and extend the evidence on this 
issue. The current crisis is a global phenomenon, and one that is regarded by many as a distinct event. 
This means that some of the usual tools favored by economists for uncovering causality (e.g. regression 
analysis) are quite limited in the crisis context. Instead, the most appropriate research relies on less formal 
detective work, involving a mix of economic theory, reasoning and history, combined with rudimentary 
statistical analysis. The most important question we must ask is which of the proposed explanations for 
the crisis are consistent with the stylized facts. To begin addressing this, we first ask: What are the facts? 
2.1. The Stylized Facts of Surging Commodity Prices 
Figure 1 presents an export price series from 1960 to May of 2008 for four major staples– maize, wheat, 
soybeans and rice– as measured in key markets in the US and (in the case of rice) Thailand (Bangkok). 
All measures are in US dollars and are deflated by the US GDP deflator. Table 1 presents some of the 
same data, but more narrowly examines changes of real prices over particular periods of interest. From 
these data we garner the following factors. 
First, the most recent (May 2008) price levels are about as high as they were in the late 1970s or 
early 1980s, in real terms. Second, prices have risen very quickly. The sharp rise in prices during the 
current crisis is similar in percentage terms to the price shocks of the 1974 crisis, although somewhat 
more spread out (also see Table 1). In both crises, rice prices shot up the most (200% in the 1974 crisis, 
255% in the current crisis). In the 1974 crisis, wheat prices rose very sharply (160%), and maize and 
soybeans both exhibited rapid prices increases on the order of 50-90%. Third, prior to the current price 
rise, the real prices of staple foods were at an all time low after declining for the better part of 30 years. It 
is not yet certain that these long-term trends and the similarities to the 1974 crisis are truly integral 
components of the current crisis, but we will argue below that there are good grounds to support this 
hypothesis. 
Figure 1. Trends in real international prices of key cereals: 1960 to May 2008 
 
Source: IMF (2008b). Data are deflated by the US GDP deflator.  3 
 
Table 1. Percentage changes of prices across commodity groups in the 1974 crisis and today (2000 
USD) 
  % Change from: 
Commodity  1970-74 2004-08 01/08-05/08   
(% 2004-08) 
Food 
Staple  crops  148.4 101.9 61.7  (60%) 
  wheat  159.8  81.4  23.6 (29%) 
  maize  80.4  88.5 43.1  (49%) 
  soybeans  88.0  52.9  47.9 (48%) 
  rice (Thailand)  200.6  255.4  191.4 (75%) 
Non-staple crops  159.3  58.3  45.8 (79%) 
Meat 24.5  4.5  10.7  (100%) 
 beef (Brazil)  n/a  40.2  21.7(54%) 
Seafood  53.0 18.0 -5.7  (0%) 
     
Other agricultural commodities 
Textiles 107.5  5.5  2.3  (42%) 
Wood  34.7 13.2 4.5  (34%) 
Cash  crops  49.4 61.3 17.8  (29%) 
     
Fertilizers  299.4 379.4 200  (53%) 
DAP:  US  GULF*  389.0 369.1 166.0  (45%) 
Potash  475.3 381.8 193.5  (51%) 
     
Metals 79.9  119.3  7.9  (6.6%) 
     
Energy 
All  energy  274.9 127.3 59.7  (47%) 
  petroleum  325.0  182.8  65.7 (36%) 
  coal  74.3  81.3 85.8  (100%) 
  natural gas  n/a  98.5  38.9 (39%) 
     
General prices     
US GDP deflator  26.0  15.5  4.2 (27%) 
     
USD per SDR  22.4  9.1   2.6 (28%) 
Source:  IMF (2008b) 
Notes: All commodity prices are deflated by the US GDP deflator so as to be expressed in constant (2000 USD) terms. *DAP is 
di-ammonium phosphate. The full list of commodities can be found in the appendix. 
A fourth stylized fact is that prices of a wide range of commodities have increased sharply. The 
surge in the price of oil is well known, as is the fact that this was a leading factor in the 1974 food crisis. 
However, all energy prices have recently risen by 80-120%, as have the prices of metals and minerals, 
and fertilizer prices roughly quadrupled during both crises. In contrast, other agricultural commodities 
(e.g. cash crops) have not risen as quickly. These patterns beg the question of whether food-specific 
factors are driving the surge in food prices, or of the surge has been due to some other factors that have 
common effects across these commodity groups, such as increasing energy costs, the depreciation of the 4 
 
US dollar, growing commodity demand from China and India, and/or investment portfolio adjustments 
related to low interest rates and the bursting of the US real estate bubble. 
A fifth stylized fact is that the timing of price rises has differed somewhat across commodities, 
and even across staple foods. Most of the price increases in wheat and maize occurred prior to 2008, 
whereas three-quarters of the increase in the price of rice occurred in 2008. A sixth stylized fact is that the 
US dollar (USD) has depreciated against a wide range of currencies. Against the other SDR currencies 
(the UK pound, Euro and Japanese yen), the USD has depreciated some 30% since the start of 2002. 
Since all of the commodities in Table 1 are expressed in USD, the price increases are much less sharp 
when measured in Euros, for example, than in USD. The increase in the nominal prices of key staples is 
around 25% less when measured in Euros, somewhat less than that when measured against the USDA 
trade-weighted agricultural exchange index, and roughly the same as that measured against the pound and 
the yen. Some authors also consider USD depreciation to be a causal factor, an issue we discuss further 
below. 
In addition to these stylized facts, we might posit one additional criterion that any plausible 
explanation of the crisis must satisfy: a potential determinant of the crisis must either precede the crisis, or 
at least distribute its effects contemporaneous to the rise in prices. Thus, a factor that emerged long before 
the crisis (e.g. ten years), or only emerged very late in the game (e.g. 2008), is unlikely to be a significant 
determinant of price rises. 
2.2. Assessing the Principal Causes of the Crisis 
Against these stylized facts, let us then consider each of the explanations that have been widely posited 
for the crisis. These are listed individually in Table 2, which also provides an assessment of the strengths 
and weaknesses of each explanation. One might also add the hypothesis of a “perfect storm”– an 
interaction and conflagration of factors– which we will consider in more detail below. 
Table 2. Proposed explanations for the 2005-2008 global food crisis, and their strengths and 
weaknesses 
Explanation Strengths  Weaknesses 
Growth in demand 
from China and India 
Partly explains rising oil prices, partly 
explains demand for oilseeds. 
China and India are self-sufficient in most 
major grains, but have not increased imports 
of any staple foods. 
Financial market 
speculation 
Increased financial market activity 
coincides with the rise in prices. 
Higher prices induce speculation, so the 
causality argument is weak. There is not yet 
clear evidence of a causal link. 
Hoarding: export 
restrictions 
Price rises for rice were preceded by 
export restrictions in countries that 
account for 40% of global rice exports. 
Wheat, maize and soybean price rises 
generally preceded restrictions, and the 
biggest players did not impose restrictions. 
Weather shocks 
 
Australian wheat production was 50-
60% below trend growth rates in 2005 
and 2006; there were also moderately 
poor harvests in US, Russia and 
Ukraine. 
Only explains wheat prices. Also, 
production shocks of this magnitude are 
common in international wheat markets, 
and in Australia over the last 15-20 years. 
Productivity 
slowdown 
Production and yield growth of rice, 
wheat and maize has slowed down over 
the last 20 years or so. 
Productivity has slowed, but it is not clear 
that demand outpaced supply over this time 
period. 
Low interest rates  Low interest rates ought to increase 
demand for storable commodities, 
increase stocks, and shift investors from 
treasury bills to commodity contracts. 
Stocks/inventories of gold and oil are 
reasonably high, but stocks of staples are 
low; there is no clear evidence that futures 




Table 2. Continued 
Explanation Strengths  Weaknesses 
Depreciation of the 
US dollar (USD) 
Real agricultural trade-weighted index 
for US depreciated 22% over 2002-07; 
USD and commodity prices are 
covariate. 
No critical weaknesses; Mitchell (2008) 
calculates that this factor probably increased 
dollar-denominated prices by 20%.  
Rising oil prices 
 
Have risen sharply, somewhat preceding 
food prices; large component of food 
production and transport costs, 
especially in wheat and corn production. 
No critical weaknesses, although some 
authors expect the effects of rising oil prices 
on food prices to be more delayed and to 
have a larger impact via biofuel demand. 
Biofuel demand 
 
Has surged since 2003 and consumed 
25% of US corn crop in 2007; two-
thirds of global maize exports are from 
US. 
Strong for corn, less so for wheat, although 
substitution effects could account for rises 
in other products. 
Decline of stocks 
 
Low stocks are traditionally associated 
with increased sensitivity to shocks; 
stocks of all major cereals declined prior 
to the price surge. 
Netting out China makes the decline in 
stocks less dramatic. Unless stock declines 
result from policies, declines only represent 
the effects of other factors. 
Source: Authors’ construction. 
Our basic conclusions are as follows. First, we more or less unequivocally reject rising demand 
from China and India as an important cause of the crisis. Many reports on the crisis have specifically 
referred to changing consumption patterns in China and India, particularly the rapid growth in meat and 
vegetable consumption. Unfortunately for advocates of this explanation, both India and China have long 
been self-sufficient in food, including the staple commodities for which international prices have been 
rising. In fact, China imported less wheat in 2000-2007 (33.8 million metric tons) than it did in the 
preceding eight years (40.3 million mt), and its rice imports also declined slightly from already low levels 
(just over 5 million mt). Indian imports of wheat and corn have also been negligible, and India is 
generally a net exporter of rice. If China and India have contributed to the crisis, they have done so 
through very indirect channels, such as by influencing the demand for oil (IEA, 2007) and global trends in 
stocks (see below). The one agricultural commodity group for which China and India have sizably 
increased their demand is oilseeds, but this “surge” began in the mid 1990s. This increased oilseeds 
demand from Asia had had some effect on global markets. For example, soybean imports within the 
developing world rose from 20.4 to 33.5 million metric tons from the mid 1990s to the present, a trend 
which contributed to US farmers increasing their soybean production area by over 11 million hectares. 
However, we estimate that grain production in the US would only have been 3% higher today than it 
would have been if this switch had not been made.
1 Moreover, it seems unlikely that rising soybean 
demand from the early to mid 1990s is likely to explain a sudden and largely unforeseen price shock ten 
years later. In fact, China and India’s steadily growing demand may provide a unique opportunity for 
many of the developing world’s smallholders to increase their production and incomes (Obwona and 
Chirwa, 2006).  
Another factor we are not particularly convinced has played a role in the current crisis is 
speculation in financial markets. This explanation has been widely discussed, but it is poorly understood 
and has been only superficially researched, with the exception of a recent Conference Board of Canada 
working paper that provides an authoritative review of the issue (CBC, 2008). One of the principal 
reasons for concern over futures markets is that their development is relatively new to agriculture, and 
                                                      
1 This is a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation. If new areas of US farmland devoted to soybeans since 1994 had been 
used for corn, and those areas followed the yield growth of the actual areas of land used for corn, then corn production today 
would be 3% higher than it is. However, this shock is very small compared to the reduction in corn food supply from increased 
biofuels demand. 6 
 
there has been increased participation of “non-commercial” participants, or speculators.
2 However, the 
potential causal linkages between futures and spot prices are unclear. Some of the recent co-movements 
between rising spot and futures prices are related the fact that financial speculation through securitization 
is most profitable when there is substantial volatility in the underlying markets. Thus, when markets are 
in turmoil, expectations of future prices may vary considerably (CBC, 2008). This suggests that 
speculation may be more a symptom of underlying volatility rather than a cause of that volatility. Also, 
many of the charges made against financial markets relate to the efficiency of their functioning rather than 
their effect on spot prices per se.
3  
Finally, the evidence supporting the potential impacts of securitization on spot prices is largely 
anecdotal and rarely indicative of causality. The contract price volatilities of the corn and wheat futures 
price indexes have increased from 19.7% and 22.2% in 1980, respectively, to 28.8% and 31.4% in 2006-
07, respectively (Schnepf, 2008), and both the price level and volatility for most agricultural commodities 
continued to rise in 2008. However, a study of the emerging lack of convergence between cash and 
futures prices did not identify any significant causal factor (Irwin et al., 2007). Other analysts have 
suggested that agricultural commodity markets are now playing a role traditionally reserved for gold and 
other precious metals– that of a safe haven for investors– but data from the US Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) suggest that the balance between long (non-commercial) and short 
(commercial) positions has been more or less maintained. Another charge is that securitized foods have 
experienced more price volatility than non-securitized foods (van Ark, 2008). However, several non-
securitized foods have indeed experienced rapid price increases,
4 and the fact that the securitized 
commodities may have been selected for futures markets precisely because of some distinguishing 
characteristics (e.g. rising or less-elastic demand, greater volatility, larger US production) suggests that 
simple comparisons of securitized and non-securitized futures prices may not be valid in any case. In 
summary, we conclude that although futures markets may have exacerbated the volatility in agricultural 
markets, they are unlikely to be a leading cause of the overall price surge, since there is little evidence 
that these markets significantly influence “real” supply and demand factors. 
Next we examine a series of commodity-specific factors that probably played some role in 
increasing the prices of the commodities in question (rice, wheat, maize, soybeans). For rice, in particular, 
export restrictions are a very compelling explanation, first because a number of important exporting 
countries that imposed restrictions, and second because rice is much more thinly traded relatively to other 
staples, with only around 7% of global production being traded over the last five years (USDA, 2008c).
5 
A closer look at the timing of export restrictions and rice price increases also suggests causality (Figure 
2). From August 2005 until November 2007, rice prices increased steadily and significantly, by about 
                                                      
2 The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has gradually loosened the rules regarding who may trade in 
agricultural futures markets, to the point that by 2008, index funds (for example) accounted for about 40 per cent of the futures 
contract trading in wheat. Non-traditional participants can now speculate on food price trends, since the value of a futures 
contract varies in relationship to the commodity prices in the current spot market, much as bond prices vary in response to 
changing interest rates. The further out the futures contracts are set for, the more they are likely to reflect expectations of future 
prices as opposed to the actual prices existing today. This affords speculators an opportunity to bet on futures contracts as a 
separate asset class quite apart from the spot prices of agricultural commodities in today’s market. 
3 Since 2006, the convergence between futures contracts and spot prices has been incomplete, perhaps indicating that the 
price discovery mechanism of futures markets has been compromised by speculative activity. Second, hedging against risk may 
become more complex for producers if the futures market is driven less by agricultural fundamentals of supply and demand and 
more by the speculative activity of uninformed non-commercial investors. Third, since futures contract market participants are 
required to sustain a maintenance margin of around 75 per cent of the initial margin position, speculation and exaggerated 
reaction to markets news (“animal spirits”) could induce excessive volatility in the market. This could lead to margin calls, which 
can significantly impinge on the working capital of smaller agricultural players. 
4 For example, some non-securitized commodities have experienced considerable price increases, including rubber, onions, 
and a wide range of metal and energy commodities (e.g. coal, iron ore, minor metals, and steel) (Gilbert, 2008). 
5 Export bans for other commodities probably also made matters worse (e.g. soybeans in Argentina and wheat in 
Kazakhstan), but the prices of these commodities had already risen significantly before the bans were in place, and the largest 
producers of other important grains did not engage in export bans. Moreover, whereas only about 7% of rice production is traded, 
over 12% of corn production is traded, and over 18% of wheat production is traded, so the markets for these commodities are 
much thicker. 7 
 
50% (in real terms) from an all-time low in 2005. In November of 2007, India imposed the first major 
export restriction, perhaps because the country does not keep large stocks relative its high levels of 
consumption and volatile production patterns. In any event, this appears to have been the turning point for 
rice prices. From November 2007 to May 2008, rice prices increased by 140%, despite an all time 
production high in 2007, the complete absence of any significant increase in demand, and fairly stable 
rice stocks (with the exception of non-trading China). In early 2008, panic ensued as the rise in other 
commodity prices began to attract much more concern in Asian markets. This prompted further export 
restrictions from Vietnam, Cambodia and Egypt, and precautionary rice purchases by the Philippines, 
which imported 1.3 million metric tons of rice in just the first four months of 2008 (an amount that 
exceeded their entire import bill of 2007). This surge continued until May, when Japan released 200,000 
tons of rice to the Philippines, partly as a result of work by Slayton and Timmer (2008). Prices fell almost 
immediately. This was followed by further price declines after Cambodia lifted its export ban in June. 
Hence, it appears that the remarkable and very costly surge in rice prices in 2008 was largely due to the 
traders’ reactions to export restrictions, plus hoarding by a number of important players in what was 
already an unusually thin market. Similar outcomes were observed in the 1974 crisis as a result of export 
restrictions on soybeans, wheat, rice and fertilizers. The tragedy of these restrictions is that they 
effectively sacrifice international price stability for the sake of domestic price stability, as Johnson (1975) 
noted after the 1974 crisis. 
Figure 2. The effect of export restrictions on rice prices 
 




buys normal annual 
quota in just 4 months 
Mar: Cambodia 
bans exports 




Nov: India bans exports 
 
Source: Price data are from USDA (2008d). 
Weather shocks offer another commodity-specific explanation for price rises, specifically for 
wheat. Most spectacularly, Australian wheat production was 50-60% below trend growth rates in 2005 
and 2006. The US also experienced a poor harvest in 2006, some 14% lower than the previous year, and 
more modest declines were seen in Russian and Ukrainian production. However, a closer inspection of 
the data suggests that this intuitively attractive explanation is not as convincing as it first appears. The 
main problem is that annual production shortfalls are a normal occurrence in agricultural production in 
general and in wheat production in particular. Global wheat production declined by 5% in 2006/07, but it 
also declined by 11% in 2000/01 and 6% in 1993/94. US wheat production fell by bigger margins in 
1991/92 (27%), 2001/02 (13%) and 2002/03 (18%), and a closer inspection of Australia’s wheat 8 
 
production since 1990 shows other years when harvests were well below trend: by 51% in 2002, and by 
50-100% from 1993 to 1995. Moreover, the output declines seen in several countries in 2007 were offset 
by large crops in Argentina, Kazakhstan, Russia and the US, whose wheat exports increased by around 
13% (or an additional 7.5 million mt) compared to those in 2006. Therefore, while overall global grain 
production declined by 1.3% in 2006, it then increased 4.7% in 2007. At best, then, these rather minimal 
shocks must have significantly interacted with other events, such as much lower buffer stocks (see below) 
or increased market sensitivity. Thus, it appears that the deeper causes ultimately do not lie in the vagaries 
of the weather. 
Increases in biofuel production offer a strong explanation for rapidly increasing prices across a 
number of different commodities (e.g. maize, some oilseeds, and soybeans), especially when one 
considers substitution effects. Once oil prices topped $60 a barrel biofuels became substantially more 
competitive against oil, such that the surge in oil prices appears to have prompted the surge in biofuel 
demand (Schmidhuber, 2006). Moreover, most analyses to date have concluded that diversion of the US 
corn crop to biofuels is the largest biofuel demand and the largest demand-induced price pressure (Abbott 
et al., 2008; Mitchell, 2008; Schnepf, 2008; von Braun, et al., 2008). This is because: (a) the use of maize 
for ethanol grew especially rapidly from 2004 to 2007, such that the ethanol industry absorbed 70% of the 
increase in global maize production over that period; (b) the US, which is the largest producer of ethanol 
from maize, is expected to use about 81 million metric tons for ethanol in the 2007/08 crop year (USDA, 
2008a); (c) the US accounts for about one-third of global maize production and two-thirds of global 
exports (Mitchell, 2008); (d) European biofuel production has largely concentrated on biodiesels, which 
use about 7% of global vegetable oil supplies (amounting to about one-third of the increase in vegetable 
oil consumption from 2004 to 2007); and (e) biofuel production in other parts of the world is either 
relatively small, or uses different crops that have not experienced price surges (e.g. sugarcane in Brazil). 
As for impacts, increased maize production (and to a less extent oilseed production) has had strong 
knock-on effects to other foods. In the US, rapid expansion of maize area by 23% in 2007 resulted in a 
16% decline in soybean area, which reduced soybean production and contributed to the 75% rise in 
soybean prices from April 2007 to April 2008 (Mitchell, 2008). In Europe, other oilseeds displaced wheat 
for the same reason. Another knock-on effect of significant concern is that biofuels have contributed to 
substantially depleting grain stocks, especially in the US (see Figure 4 in Helbling et al., 2008).
6  
A range of more formal modeling exercises also suggest that biofuels have had significant 
impacts on grain prices, although these simulations vary substantially in terms of the time periods 
considered, the prices used (export, import, wholesale, or retail), the coverage of food products, the 
currency in which prices are expressed, and whether prices are real or nominal (Schnepf, 2008).
7 The 
results from the more rigorous methodologies suggest that biofuels account for 60-70% of the increase in 
corn prices and maybe 40% of soybean price increases (Lipsky, 2008; Collins, 2008). Rosegrant et al. 
(2008) find that the long-term impact of accelerated biofuel production on maize prices is about 47%. The 
latter model also finds strong substitution effects on wheat and rice prices, with price increases of 26 and 
25%, respectively (using Schnepf’s conversion from the real price estimates of the model); this is on a 
similar order of magnitude to the results from the World Bank’s linkages model (World Bank, 2008).
8 
Therefore, biofuels not only strongly account for maize price increases, they also help explain price rises 
                                                      
6 Mitchell estimates that if vegetable oil areas used for biodiesel had been used for wheat production, then European wheat 
stocks would have been almost as large in 2007 as they were in 2001, rather than lower by almost half (although it is not clear 
that in the absence of biofuel production farmers would increased harvest areas devoted to wheat). 
7 General equilibrium models generate long-term price impacts resulting from specific shocks by factoring in 
interactions between markets, but their ability to capture short-term price dynamics is highly constrained. 
Conversely, detailed studies of specific crops may include short-term dynamics, but often exclude impacts on other 
markets. There are also issues as to whether shocks should be considered independent (Schnepf, 2008). 
8 The role of biofuel policies is beyond the scope of this review; see the reviews by Schnepf (2008) and Abbott 
et al. (2008). The latter offers a critical appraisal of some of these simulations. However, shocks of this magnitude 
are a compelling explanation for the rapid price rises in several commodities, and reasonably significant substitution 
effects across others. 9 
 
in other staples (although doubts have been expressed about how realistic these sizeable substation effects 
are; see Abbott et al., 2008). 
The remaining explanations– oil prices, global macroeconomic phenomena, and declining stocks– 
are even less crop-specific. Relative to its output, agriculture does not use that much energy; however, 
several lines of reasoning suggest that oil prices probably have a large impact on the costs of agricultural 
production (see Table 3, and Appendix A in Headey and Fan, 2008). First, the energy used in agricultural 
production is mostly oil-related, and oil prices have risen faster than the prices of other energy sources 
(Table 1). Moreover, US food production– which dominates world food production and export markets– 
is especially oil-intensive. Second, oil prices affect the prices of fertilizers and other chemicals used in 
crop production. For wheat and corn, fertilizer prices alone account for over a third of total operating 
costs and 15-20% of total costs. Factoring in the rising costs of fuel, fertilizers and other oil-related farm 
productions, we estimate that oil prices increased the costs of US production of corn, wheat and soybeans 
by 30-40% over 2001-2007 relative to a baseline scenario in which oil-related prices only increased by 
the inflation of the US GDP deflator (Table 3).
9 These fuel-based cost increases correspond to about 8% 
of the observed corn price increases, 11% of soybean price increases, and about 20% of wheat price 
increases. Finally, oil prices also affect transport costs, such that the margin between domestic and export 
prices has added as much as 10.2% to the export prices of corn and wheat (Mitchell, 2008). Hence, the 
combined increase in production and transport costs for the major US food commodities– corn, soybeans 
and wheat– could account for 20-30% of the increase in US export prices (Mitchell, 2008).
10 
Table 3. The estimated impact of fuel-related costs on US farming costs, 2001-2007 
 Corn  Soybeans  Wheat 
(1) Yield gap, 2001-2007  0.9  0.9  1.0 
(2) Projected costs in 2007 with 2001 cost levels  
extrapolated to 2007 via the US GDP deflator 
325.1 225.6  180.1 
(3) Actual total costs in 2007   453.5  295.4  235.7 
(4) Difference = (3)-(2)  39.5  30.9  30.9 
(5) Difference deflated by yield growth = (4)*(1)  35.5  27.8  27.8 
(6) Percentage change in prices received by farmers*  132.6 99.0  101.7 
(7) Oil-related cost increase as percentage of total price 
increase paid to farmers = (5)/(6) 
8.0 11.0 20.3 
Source: Authors’ calculations from USDA data (2008b).  
Notes: *The percentage change in prices uses actual prices received by farmers for 2000/2001, and actual prices received by 
farmers in 2006 multiplied by the percentage change in US export prices, since actual prices received by farmers in 2007 are not 
yet available. If farmers received less than the full US export price change from 2006 to 2007, then row (7) is underestimated. 
A second commodity-wide explanation of surging prices is the depreciation of the US dollar 
(USD) over the last six years, especially against the Euro. The depreciation of the USD can clearly 
account for the rise in dollar-denominated food prices in an arithmetical sense, cutting off 20-30% of the 
nominal dollar increase in the case of conversion from USD to Euros. But as Abbott et al. (2008) discuss, 
when the dollar weakens, agricultural exports (particularly grain and oilseeds) also increase, ceteris 
                                                      
9 Mitchell (2008) uses different assumptions to find that the production-weighted average increase in the cost of production 
due to these energy-intensive inputs for maize, wheat and soybeans was 11.5% between 2002 and 2007. However, he deflates 
2008 yields by 2002 yields, which was a poor harvest in the US, and does not distinguish among total costs. See Headey and Fan 
(2008). 
10 Of course, these are not very sophisticated estimates, as they do not utilize supply and demand elasticities, which 
influence the degree to which increased production costs affect supply responses and market prices. 10 
 
paribus. Using the USDA’s agricultural trade-weighted index of real foreign currency per unit of deflated 
dollars, Abbott et al. find that from 2002 to 2007, the dollar depreciated 22% and the value of agricultural 
exports increased 54%. Assuming that the US is a large country in international agricultural markets– 
which is certainly true in the case of wheat, corn and soybeans– depreciation of the USD should lead to 
higher prices in the US, but lower prices in the rest of the world. Previous research has indicated that 
depreciation of the dollar increases dollar-denominated commodity prices with an elasticity of between 
0.5 and 1.0 (Gilbert, 1989). Mitchell (2008) therefore calculates that the depreciation of the dollar has 
increased food prices by around 20%, assuming an elasticity of 0.75. Abbott et al. also show that in the 
current crisis the divergence between the dollar and many (but not all) other currencies has been quite 
stark compared to previous increases in nominal dollar-denominated food prices (e.g. 1995/96).  
Another theory that has been advanced in some quarters is that low real interest rates, especially 
in the US, have caused a general price increase in a wide range of commodities (for a discussion of this 
theory, see Frankel, 1984).
11 Low interest rates increase the demand for storable commodities, increase 
the desires of firms to carry inventories, and encourage speculators to shift out of treasury bills and into 
commodity contracts. All three of these mechanisms work to increase the market price of commodities, in 
what is often known as “carry trade.” It is questionable, however, whether this explanation is actually 
consistent with the evidence. One inconsistency is that agricultural inventories are low rather than high 
(see below for further discussion). Moreover, the diversion of assets from treasury bills and the like to 
commodities may have influenced agricultural futures prices, but as we noted above, the jury is still out as 
to whether this has had a substantial effect on spot prices. 
We next turn to stock declines, which could influence price volatility by determining the stability 
of supply. This might constitute a crop-specific explanation, especially given that stocks have declined for 
maize, wheat and rice, often below the FAO (1983) benchmark of 17-18% of total consumption that is 
predicted to substantially stabilize prices and consumption (see Table A.1 in our Appendix).12 Therefore, 
recent data and strong historical covariance between prices and stocks superficially suggest that stock 
declines could substantially account for recent price movements. However, there are some significant 
caveats to this conclusion. Most importantly, declining stocks might simply reflect increased demand or 
reduced production levels. Biofuel production offers a promising explanation for declines in maize stocks 
(see above), and bad weather, stagnating production growth and low prices seem to account for the almost 
pervasive decline in wheat stocks (although unexpectedly, wheat stocks have risen in Australia). For stock 
declines to be causally related to the current crisis, they must therefore be associated with exogenous 
policy decisions, or other forces.  
We see three such policy decisions that could support a causal relationship. First, it may be that 
stocks were so high and prices were so low prior to 2000 that there appeared to be a need to reduce 
stocks. Second, the increasing use of just-in-time inventory systems may have led to lower stocks. These 
two explanations are plausible but generally difficult to prove.  is the explicit policy decision made by 
China to reduce stocks of major cereals, which were inefficiently high in the 1990s. But it is difficult to 
fathom why China’s stocks should have any direct effect on international prices unless market actors 
irrationally took heed of these declines, since China is self-sufficient in major grains. Indeed, netting out 
China from global stocks trends turns out to be very important (see Appendix Table A.1). World stocks 
for maize, for example, declined from 26% of usage over 1990-2000 to just 14% of consumption from 
2005-2008, but excluding China from the global figures suggests that world stocks remained the same 
over the two periods, at just 12%. Nevertheless, a large number of major producing and exporting 
countries have incurred substantial stock declines in recent years.  
All in all, we conclude that stock declines are consistent with rising prices but not as causally 
convincing as it might appear at first glance, partly because they are a symptom of deeper causes, and 
                                                      
11 Frankel is also the main proponent of this theory as an explanation of the current crisis. Several discussions can be found 
on his website at: http://content.ksg.harvard.edu/blog/jeff_frankels_weblog/. 
12 However, one clearly needs to distinguish between optimal stocks for countries that predominantly consume staples 
versus those that predominantly export staples. The latter type of country generally has little interest in keeping reserves in excess 
of the “carryover” stocks designed to ensure a steady supply of staples to its export destinations. 11 
 
partly because their effects on prices are enacted through interactions with other factors (e.g. exacerbating 
shocks). It is also possible that excessively high stocks in the 1990s (and before the 1974 crisis) were 
actually an underlying cause of the crisis: The use of stocks to satisfy increasing demand may have 
delayed price rises that would otherwise have provided a stronger signal of rising demand. In terms of 
policy implications, it is therefore not altogether clear that increasing stocks once more would prevent 
further food crises. 
2.3. A Simple Model of the 2005-08 Food Crisis 
The analysis above indicates that some of the proposed explanations of the food crisis are more 
convincing than others. Two or three factors offer convincing commodity-wide explanations of rising 
prices, namely increased oil prices, depreciation of the US dollar, and increased production biofuels, 
while explanations such as declining stocks, low interest rates and financial speculation are less well 
documented and less theoretically convincing. In addition, several hypotheses offer commodity-specific 
explanations, although these too vary from highly convincing explanations (e.g. export restrictions on 
rice) to somewhat less convincing explanations (e.g. weather shocks). Moreover, there are some complex 
interactions among these factors that generally reinforce each other, in what the director of the WFP has 
called a “perfect storm.” We therefore conclude this section by outlining a model that we believe broadly 
captures the main causal mechanisms of the current crisis (Figure 3).  
Figure 3. A summary model of the principal causes of the crisis: a near-perfect storm 
 
Source: Authors’ construction.  
Note: Boxes in gray denote weaker, crop-specific causes. The decline of the US dollar and the rise in oil prices are shown 
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3.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS 
A number of factors, such as food riots, export restrictions, dependency on food imports, and the 
persistent increases in food and oil prices, suggest that the recent surge in food prices will have a severe 
impact on the poorer populations of the world, perhaps even throwing more than 100 million people into 
poverty (World Bank, 2008; Ivanic and Martin, 2008). These predictions, however, require closer 
examination, and often benefit from significant qualification. The group most vulnerable to rising food 
prices is generally the urban poor, but this group is also far more vociferous than the rural poor (Bezemer 
and Headey, 2008). Thus, protests may be evidence of suffering, but net suffering. Price changes always 
create winners and losers, and judging among them requires accurate data and careful analysis at both the 
macro and micro levels. In Figure 4, we depict eight steps through which international prices influence 
households, with pertinent policy questions listed in gray outside each box. Most macroeconomic studies 
focus on the areas listed in boxes 1 through 4 (a few focus on the substitution effects given in box 5), and 
most microeconomic studies focus on boxes 6 through 8. This dichotomy is unfortunate, because it is by 
no means clear that countries that are vulnerable in a microeconomic sense (i.e. that have high rates of 
poverty and hunger) are automatically vulnerable in a macroeconomic sense (i.e. by having high import 
bills, low reserves, and high rates of transmission), and vice versa. In this section, we will attempt to 
bridge the gaps between the disparate findings of different datasets and studies as best we can, and 
provide some conceptual analysis of the analytical issues involved. 
Figure 4. The transmission from international markets to household welfare  
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3.1. Macroeconomic Impacts 
Import Bills 
Many recent impact studies refer solely to food prices, but any comprehensive assessment of current 
poverty trends needs to incorporate changes in a range of prices, including those of fuel and fertilizers. 
Oil prices, in particular, will have a pervasive effect on a country’s vulnerability to the current crisis 
through their impact on exchange rates, foreign reserves, transport costs and domestic inflation. For these 
reasons, the most relevant macroeconomic assessments of the crisis incorporate the effects of rising oil 
prices. Particularly useful in this regard is a recent IMF (2008a) assessment of import bills based on net 
import positions with respect to food, oil and other commodities.  
As for food imports in particular, the dependency of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) on 
imported food has attracted considerable attention since the crisis began, but remains a question that 
merits closer inspection.
13 Aksoy and Ng (2008) recalculate net food imports, but disaggregate their 
outcomes by oil exporters, conflict states, small islanders and “normal” countries. They find that a typical 
“normal” low and middle-income country went from being a net food importer in 1980/81 to being a net 
food exporter in 2004/05. Moreover, only six low-income countries have food deficits that are more than 
10% of their imports. The main exceptions to these conclusions are African countries, which tend to rely 
more heavily on cash crop production. As for oil producers, their terms of trade and reserve status have 
improved so much in recent years that they should be less vulnerable to rising food prices in a purely 
macroeconomic sense. Net exporters of other minerals have also benefited (e.g. Zambia, Mozambique), 
albeit to a lesser degree, as have countries that are net exporters of labor to oil-producing countries (South 
Asian countries, the Philippines) (Rosen and Shapouri, 2008).  
For these reasons, we might regard the greater geographical concentration of oil production– and 
the larger rise in oil prices– as a greater macroeconomic threat to developing countries. Indeed, oil 
imports are 2.5 times larger than food imports for low-income countries and twice as large for middle-
income countries, meaning that the impact of commensurate price increases is much greater for oil, as 
confirmed in Table 4 (IMF 2008a). 
Table 4. Number of countries affected by food and oil price increases 
 Low-income  Middle-income 
Countries with severe negative shocks: 
1 
  Oil price shock  
  Food price shock 









Countries with positive shocks: 
2 
  Oil price shock  
  Food price shock  









Countries with less-than-adequate 
reserves: 
  Before the shocks  
  After the oil price increase  
  After the food price increase  











Total countries  74  71 
Source: IMF (2008b). 
Notes: 
1 Drop in reserves larger than 0.5 months of imports. 
2 Shock results in an increase in reserves. 
                                                      
13 The FAO classifies 82 developing countries as low-income food-deficit countries (LIFDC), largely based on the idea that 
national food demand exceeds production. Gürkan et al. (2003) calculate food import bills from 1970 to 2001 and find that 
developing countries have become more dependent upon food imports for consumption. 14 
 
Exchange Rate Movements and Foreign Reserves 
The next two components of food price impacts– exchange rate movements and foreign reserves– are best 
discussed jointly since the two are causally linked. As noted in Section 2, some but not all currencies have 
appreciated against the USD (see Figure 5). The distribution of nominal appreciations is bipolar, with one 
pole representing the Euro countries and the West African CFA France zone (which is pegged to the 
Euro); their common currency has appreciated by some 80% over this period. In contrast, the second pole 
denotes the Central American and Caribbean countries, which include countries formally and informally 
pegged to the USD. Real exchange rate movements– albeit from a somewhat small sample of countries– 
are still centered around a positive mean, but the distribution is slightly less bimodal. The main message 
of Figure 5 is that movements against the USD have generally been positive, but have still varied 
substantially, especially across developing regions. 
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Sources: Panel A: Authors’ calculations from IMF (2008b) data covering 124 countries. Panel B: Authors’ calculations from 
USDA (2008c) data covering 95 countries. 
These variations– along with dependence on food/cereal imports– will significantly determine the 
degree of macroeconomic transmission of rising USD-denominated prices. Consider, for example, a 
Central American or Caribbean country that is formally or loosely pegged to the USD. This country’s 
exchange rate will generally have appreciated against the Euro and other currencies, making it unlikely 
that the country will find cheaper imports from outside the US (especially once transport and other 
transaction costs are factored in). Moreover, variations in trade patterns determine the composition of 
foreign exchange reserves for countries, so a country having only limited trade with non-US countries 
will also have a limited foreign exchange capacity. Since the US is the only highly dominant cereal 
exporter in the world, it is therefore worth investigating the relationship between dependency on US food 
imports and exchange rate movements against the USD (see Appendix Table A.2). Unsurprisingly, such 
an analysis suggests that the regions that are most dependent on the US as a source of food imports are 
Central America, the Caribbean and some of the more northern countries of South America. A few other 
countries and regions are relatively dependent on the US for food imports, but many such countries are 
either wealthy or have experienced large real appreciations against the USD (e.g. Nigeria).
14  
As for foreign exchange reserves, the IMF has calculated months of imports as of 2008. 
Disconcertingly, the Caribbean and Central American countries also look highly vulnerable in this 
                                                      
14 A complementary pattern in the data relates to corn and wheat exports. The USDA’s trade-weighted real exchange rate 
index for corn– which is mostly exported to Latin America– fell by just over 4% from January 2005 to July 2008, while the 
analogous index for wheat fell by almost 19%. 
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dimension, although the South American countries seem somewhat better off. In Africa, there is some 
discrepancy between oil exporters (generally with large reserves) and non-oil exporters (with smaller 
reserves), so few generalizations can be made; however, many countries have sufficiently low reserves to 
warrant concern. The same is true of Asia. Of greatest concern is the notion that rising oil prices will eat 
up foreign exchange reserves (Table 3), leaving only scarce reserves left for food imports.  
Transmission in Domestic Markets and the Impact on Inflation 
Despite reasonable data on export prices, exchange rates and import dependency, very little up-to-date 
data are available on food prices in developing countries. A few recent studies have examined price 
transmission in selected countries or regions, but a big picture overview has proven elusive so far.
15 One 
recent FAO study on the current crisis re-analyzes the extent of price transmission in seven large Asian 
countries from the fourth quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2007 (Dawe, 2008), a period which 
admittedly does not capture the full international price increase, especially in rice. Overall transmission– 
measured as the ratio of LCU-denominated retail price changes to USD-denominated export prices– 
varies considerably among the seven countries studied. In India, the Philippines and Vietnam the pass-
through is just 6-11%, while it is 41-65% in the remaining countries. Interestingly, movements in the real 
exchange rate explain more than half of the price difference between USD-denominated export prices and 
local currency-denominated (LCU) local currencies, with the main exception of Bangladesh.
16 Dawe also 
found that wheat prices appeared to be partially transmitted in India and Indonesia, but fully transmitted 
in Bangladesh. Some of the impacts of food price increases on inflation in Asian countries are also 
estimated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2008), while some recent data on international price 
changes (US, Thai and South African markets) and domestic price changes for African countries are 
presented in Appendix C of Headey and Fan (2008). While these data should be interpreted with great 
care because of the lack of a suitable price deflator, the findings generally suggest that commodity-
specific price transmission in Africa has been limited thus far, except in Ethiopia (see Ulimwengu et al., 
2008).
17  
In terms of a broader picture of price changes, more comprehensive but less detailed data can be 
obtained by examining recent inflation trend datasets, such as those on food inflation and total inflation 
available from the World Bank (2008) for 2007 and early 2008. In Table 4, we present these data by 
region and use it to calculate nonfood inflation based on estimates of household food expenditure shares 
(Column 3). We then calculate the difference between food and nonfood inflation as a measure of relative 
price change (Column 4). Among these patterns, we find that food inflation is high in all regions, varying 
from around 9.5 to 18%. However, this in itself is not indicative of real or relative prices changes. 
Column 4 shows the differential, which can be thought of as the change in the terms of trade (TOT) for 
food. On average, food inflation has outpaced nonfood inflation at a faster rate outside of Africa than it 
has within Africa.
18  
                                                      
15 In terms of commodity-specific price transmission, historical evidence certainly suggests that these will probably vary 
considerably over commodities, regions and times, but are generally lower than one might expect a priori (see Conforti, 2004; 
Baffes and Gardner, 2003; Sharma, 1996, 2002). However, the previous studies offer little specific guidance as to the overall 
transmission of international prices to particular countries, due to the effects of context-specific circumstances (e.g. exchange rate 
movements and rising oil prices). 
16 In an update for 2008, Dawe also found that Bangladeshi wholesale prices rose by 29% from December 2007 to March 
2008, Philippino prices increased by 25% from February to early April 2008, Indian prices rose 18% from October 2007 to 
March 2008, and Thai prices increased by 17% from January to February 2008. As of the middle of March, wholesale prices in 
both China and Indonesia had remained relatively stable. 
17 Ethiopia’s example is instructive, however, because it illustrates that the term “transmission” can be somewhat misleading 
insofar as domestic factors can not only depress transmission (as with rice in Asia), but also accelerate domestic price changes. 
Quite rapid price accelerations in Ethiopia and Kenya were largely a consequence of domestic factors (drought and domestic 
policies in Ethiopia, drought and conflict in Kenya). 
18 We have confirmed the statistical significance of the difference between Africa TOT trends and those of other regions, 
using t-tests for differences in means. However, it is important to note that there is substantial variation within this African 
sample, which is also relatively small (12 countries). So we might cautiously say that the effects within Africa– easily the poorest 16 
 
Table 5. Food inflation, total inflation and estimates of trends in the terms of trade: 2007/08 














Std. dev. of 
￿TOTfood 
South Asia (5)  11.1  15.1  5.9  8.0  11.4 
East  Asia  (8)  5.9 10.1  0.8 8.4  7.8 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  (12)  7.9 9.5 6.1 3.0  8.2 
Middle East & N. Africa (4)  6.6  9.4  2.4  5.7  2.3 
C. America & Caribbean 
(11)  9.0 13.1  5.6 8.2  7.1 
S.  America  (8)  6.4 11.4  2.7 10.0  6.0 
E. Europe & C. Asia (9)  14.0  18.2  7.1  8.4  9.3 
Small islands (3)  8.3  15.7  0.6  14.8  12.6 
Source: World Bank (2008) for total and food inflation data, with authors’ own estimates of nonfood inflation based on FAO data 
on food expenditures shares from http://www.fao.org/faostat/foodsecurity/index_en.htm. 
Notes: * Nonfood inflation is calculated with estimates of the share of food in total household expenditure, which are derived 
from a regression of sample food expenditure shares from 36 countries against GDP per capita and continental dummy variables. 
All variables are significant at the 10% level or higher, and the R-squared is 0.52.  
Figure 6. Average annual CPI inflation from January 2005 to July 2008 
 
Source: IMF (2008b). 
Notes: Inflation is calculated until July 2008 wherever possible, although in many cases data were only available up to May or 
June, and in a few cases (Pacific Islands and Middle-income Caribbean) only March or April. #The five mineral exporters are 
Nigeria, Zambia, Botswana, Angola, Sierra Leone (the latter is only a moderate exporter, however). *Indicates that the regional 
group excludes any counties that are listed individually or in the mineral exporter category; e.g. West and Central Africa excludes 
Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone, and East Africa excludes Kenya and Ethiopia. 
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Because of the limited timeframe of the data in Table 4 (the data only cover 2007 and the first 
few months of 2008), Figure 6 looks at inflation from 2005 to July 2008 (although in some cases the data 
terminate in May or June). Our basic strategy in Figure 6 is to group data by smaller regions and extract 
outlying countries from those regions. We also look at five mineral exporters in Africa. Notably, the data 
appear to confirm some of the conjectures made earlier. First, prices have risen most quickly in the three 
countries in which domestic factors (weather shocks and/or conflict) have also contributed substantially to 
price increases, namely Myanmar, Ethiopia and Kenya. Ghana is something of an outlier, but it is also a 
country in which transmission of rising international prices could not be the whole story. Although Ghana 
imports wheat and rice and some maize, Ghanaian diets are diverse, and the Ghanaian currency has 
appreciated against the US dollar (a combination of higher oil prices, large remittances and increased 
government spending are usually blamed for Ghana’s inflation). Yemen is perhaps a more conventional 
example of a country that is vulnerable to rising prices, since it is heavily dependent upon food imports. 
As for the other groups, the five mineral exporters have also experienced high inflation, but this is 
surely due in large part to increased export earnings and Dutch Disease (appreciation of the exchange 
rate). Nonfood inflation in Nigeria, for example, appears to have surpassed food inflation. South Asia also 
experienced accelerated inflation due to a mix of dependence on oil imports, dependence on rice, limited 
exchange rate movements (especially in Bangladesh), and domestic factors. Several Central Asian 
countries have experienced rapid inflation, although mineral exports and Dutch Disease may well be a 
story in these cases, as well. Central America and the low-income Caribbean countries have also 
experienced fairly high inflation, as expected. As for the other groups, the main story is that inflation has 
averaged around 6-8% per annum in most African countries. West Africa– a region largely tied to the 
Euro– has had the lowest inflation of all the regions sampled. Therefore, although many African countries 
are highly vulnerable in a microeconomic sense, in that poverty and hunger rates are high, and many 
Africans seem to be net food buyers, it is not obvious that actual price rises have thus had a major impact 
in most of Africa. 
Against these relatively optimistic conclusions, we should make some important caveats. First, 
the buffer to larger price transmissions that has been provided by the depreciation of the USD over the 
past few years is not a permanent one. Several important currencies, including the Euro, are now 
considered by many to be highly overvalued, perhaps indicating that the dollar may strengthen in the near 
future, thus leading to faster price transmissions in regions such as West Africa.  
Second, price transmission may be low because of costly government policies aimed at 
dampening price rises. The World Bank (2008) provides data indicating that some 84 countries reduced 
their net taxation of food, and around 30 imposed export restrictions of one form or another. The IMF 
(2008a) estimates the fiscal cost of these actions for both food and fuel. In many instances, these taxes 
and subsidies transfer the burden of rising prices from the market to the government’s coffer, on average 
adding at least one percentage point to budget deficits (% GDP), or otherwise requiring cutbacks in other 
expenditures that may also be important for the poor, at least in the longer run (e.g. expenditure, health 
and agricultural investment). The question of whether it is advisable to absorb international price rises 
through these taxes, subsidies, or export restrictions is a complicated calculus that is beyond the scope of 
the present analysis, but is certainly worthy of further study. As Valdes and Siamwalla (1981) noted after 
the 1974 crisis, volatile food prices are a problem because of the inability of the poor to smooth their 
consumption via capital markets. Insofar as governments have better access to capital markets than the 
poor, government policies that transfer the burden of rising international food prices to fiscal deficits may 
be preferable to allowing full price transmission. The second issue, of course, is the distributional 
implication of each of these tax and transfer programs (e.g. see Essama-Nssah, 2008, for a conceptual 
analysis and review, and Arndt et al., 2008, for an application to rising food prices in Mozambique). 
A final caveat is that the full transmission of international prices may take some time. Some of 
the transmission mechanisms are quite complex. Food prices can be directly transmitted through food 
imports, but producers of tradable foods (or exporters of food) can also experience rising prices because 
the prices they face are partially determined in world markets. In some cases, such as Uganda, a country 
may not be directly vulnerable because of diverse diets and production systems, but rising prices in 18 
 
neighboring countries (e.g. Kenya) can create trade opportunities that put pressure on domestic prices 
(Benson, 2008). Moreover, some regions within a country– especially rural regions– may be more 
isolated from international price increases compared to urban areas, due to high transport costs 
(Ulimwengu et al., 2008; Codjoe et al., 2008). All of these complexities point to the need for research that 
combines detailed macro- and microeconomic analyses (e.g. Arndt et al., 2008). 
3.2. Microeconomic Vulnerability to Rising Food Prices 
Given that we know so little, at least at a cross-country level, about the extent of food price changes or the 
costliness of policies aimed at mitigating price increases, it should be no surprise that we know even less 
about the impacts of rising prices on poverty. The cross-country poverty simulations performed to date, 
namely Ivanic and Martin’s (2008) nine-country study, Zezza et al.’s (2008) 11-country study, Wodon et 
al.’s (2008) study of 12 West African countries, and Dessus et al.’s (2008) study of the urban sector of 73 
developing countries, show us the likely impacts on poverty in response to given price changes. Because 
none of these experiments incorporate actual price changes, the simulations tell us who would be 
vulnerable to rising prices, but not which populations are actually experiencing hardship as a result of 
rising food prices. Furthermore, these studies assume common price changes across countries, even 
though (as seen above) changes in food prices are likely to vary substantially across countries. 
Nevertheless, these studies are methodologically insightful, and empirically useful for identifying 
vulnerability to price changes across countries and subnational groups (e.g. rural and urban). All four 
studies can also tell us about the incidence of poverty changes (poverty headcounts) as well the extent of 
changes (e.g. poverty gaps). Indeed, the Wodon et al. (2008) and Ivanic and Martin (2008) studies have 
been particularly influential in framing World Bank responses to the crisis (World Bank, 2008) and 
catalyzing support from other institutions. 
These studies also make a useful comparison, because all four  use quite recent microeconomic 
surveys and similar simulation methods. Such a comparison reveals the following similarities: First, all 
four papers look at real food price changes, but not all examine oil or fertilizer prices, even though rising 
oil prices in particular could have a larger effect on poverty than food prices.
19 Second, each study focuses 
on short-run impacts by precluding significant behavioral responses by producers and consumers of food, 
or significant partial or general equilibrium effects on prices in other sectors. All four studies explicitly 
acknowledge this, and the Martin and Ivanic and Zezza et al. studies also calculate some partial 
equilibrium effects on household income as robustness tests (their findings except for some redistribution 
of negative impacts from rural to urban households in the case of Ivanic and Martin’s unskilled wage 
effects. Nevertheless, there could be other behavioral responses to rising food prices, even in the short 
run. For example, many poor households have diversified income sources and may have substantial scope 
to increase farm-based activities as food prices rise.  
Finally, the main methodological framework of each study is relatively similar, in that they all 
follow Deaton’s (1989) approach, which essentially the welfare effect of rising food prices at the urban, 
rural or country level depends upon the number of people who are poor and vulnerable (just above the 
poverty line), whether those people are net buyers or net sellers of food, and whether they are marginal or 
significant net sellers/buyers. This calculation leads to some nuanced expectations of which groups might 
be expected to suffer most from rising prices. On one hand, urban populations have large numbers of net 
food buyers, but they also tend to be better off than the rural population. Moreover, rural populations 
might also contain surprisingly large numbers of net food buyers due to the prevalence of nonfarm 
workers, cash crop production, low-productivity food production or landlessness (Ahmed et al., 2007). A 
somewhat surprising insight of Ivanic and Martin’s study, is that rural poverty increases by more than 
urban poverty in two of the three African countries surveyed. In Zambia, rural poverty increases by three 
                                                      
19 Arndt et al.’s (2008) study of Mozambique, for example, finds that rising fuel prices lead to much larger increases in 
poverty than rising food prices, and Passa Orio and Wodon (2008) estimate the longer-term impact of specific commodity price 
spikes on the price of other commodities through a social accounting matrix multiplier approach, and find that indirect effects are 
significantly larger for oil than for food in three of eight countries sampled. 19 
 
times as much as urban poverty, even though initial poverty rates were roughly the same in the rural and 
urban areas (of course, poverty rates do not capture the number of people who are vulnerable). 
The large effects on rural poverty that result from these simulations seem somewhat at odds with 
both prior intuitions and other evidence on these issues. Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik (2008), for example, 
analyze some of the same surveys as Ivanic and Martin, but conclude that: (a) although most poor 
households are net food buyers, almost 50% are marginal net buyers; and (b) net buyers typically have 
higher average incomes than net food sellers in eight of the nine countries studied. Another partial 
explanation of large changes in rural poverty may be that household surveys have some tendency to 
underestimate the degree to which households are net sellers of food, because the consumption side of 
household accounts is generally better measured than the production side.
20 For similar reasons, 
household incomes in rural regions may not be measured as well as they are in urban regions. Thus, it is 
possible that certain survey biases are also influencing the outcomes of these simulations, although we do 
not have any clear idea of the strength of these biases. 
A final issue relates to the diversity of microeconomic vulnerability across countries. Clearly, a 
range of factors influence the vulnerability of households to rising food prices within and across countries 
(Figure 4). Zezza et al. (2008) go further than the other simulation studies by disaggregating vulnerability 
across groups and explaining vulnerability measures  OLS regressions. Across 13 developing countries 
around the developing world, the authors find that the most vulnerable households have the following 
characteristics: they are urban or rural non-farm; larger, and less educated; more dependent on female 
labor; less well served by infrastructure; and, within the rural sector, have limited access to land and 
modern agricultural inputs. All of these findings are fairly intuitive, but it is still useful to see 
microeconomic evidence confirming these intuitions and offering orders of magnitude and insight into 
which household attributes matter most.  
To summarize, these studies suggest that poverty (including rural poverty) will generally increase 
in the short run if food prices rise substantially, and Zezza et al.’s (2008) study also offers insights into 
which types of households are most vulnerable to rising food prices. At the same time, it is important to 
remember the limitations of these simulations. Ultimately, we still need to learn much more about actual 
price changes, the additional impacts of increased fuel and fertilizer prices, the short term behavioral 
responses to rising food prices, and about how government policies can influence these outcomes.  
                                                      
20 We thank Xinshen Diao for this astute comment. The specific argument is that the consumption side of micro surveys is 
more regularly updated, whereas production, being largely seasonal, is only measured at distant intervals. It is sometimes argued 
that household income is also underestimated in these surveys. 20 
 
4.  KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE FUTURE 
The recent surge in food prices has been widely termed a crisis, and not without justification. A 
conflagration of factors has caused food prices to rise much more quickly than is desirable (Section 2), 
and whatever the precise impacts so far (Section 3), it is clear that many of the world’s poor have already 
experienced the harsh reality of more costly sustenance. Moreover, although food prices have probably 
already peaked, food prices are (in real terms) expected to stay high for several years to come (USDA, 
2008a), especially if oil prices remain high and demand for biofuels persists. On this basis, it would be 
premature to conclude that the crisis is over.  
However, despite the acute problems that rising food prices have caused, this crisis also presents 
opportunities for positive change. As was the case in 1974, the current crisis has made the weaknesses of 
the global food system transparent to a broader audience, and has focused considerable attention back 
onto the fundamental roles played by food production and food security both in current welfare and in the 
longer-run process of development. Despite the political constraints of the time, the 1974 crisis produced 
and bolstered a number of new institutions, such as the WFP, IFAD, CGIAR and the Global Information 
and Early Warning System (GIIEWS); these have been mostly successful in improving food security and 
raising agricultural productivity (Headey and Raszap Skorbiansky, 2008). At the same time, however, 
international policymakers (both then and now) have failed to address the most fundamental deficiencies 
of the global food system, including low levels of agricultural investment and aid (Bezemer and Headey, 
2008), and excessive reliance on the reserve systems of major grain producers as a distant Second Best 
alternative to freer trade.  
The international policymaking community has an obligation and a mandate to redress a thirty-
year complacency towards these issues (von Braun et al., 2008), but progress so far has been uneven, 
especially with respect to subsidies and trade. One part of the challenge at the national level is to ensure 
that the poor and vulnerable (i.e. the non-marginal net buyers of food) do not slip further into poverty. 
Macroeconomic policies can buffer the rise in food prices to some extent, while microeconomic social 
protection programs can more aptly target the most vulnerable populations. A second challenge, however, 
is to use this crisis to permanently lift poor food producers, who comprise some 60-70% of the world’s 
poor, out of poverty. Even prior to the current crisis, many development specialists had called for 
renewed efforts to invoke a Green Revolution in Africa (see Diao et al., 2008), and the recent price surge 
has clearly brought renewed attention to agricultural development issues. The challenge, however, will be 
to sustain these efforts once prices have fallen, grain stocks have been rebuilt, and the crisis atmosphere 
has abated
.21 After all, for the 800 million hungry people of the world, food crises are not a one-off event . 
. . they are a daily reality.  
                                                      
21 Here we are paraphrasing Valdes and Siamwalla (1981), who came to the following conclusion in the years following the 
1972-74 crisis: “International prices of cereals have fallen in real terms, grain stocks have been rebuilt, and the crisis atmosphere 
has abated. World food security has ceased to be a major concern for the press and for the general public. Yet, the underlying 
causes of food crises such as the one in 1972-74 have not disappeared . . . on the international scene only limited progress has 
been made to help them in these efforts.” 21 
 
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL DATA 
Table A.1. Trends in stocks relative to domestic consumption plus exports among major exporters 
and consumers 
   Major  Stocks/(cons+exports)   
Commodity  Country  exporter?  1990-00 2005-08 Outcome 
Maize  Argentina  Yes  6 7 Up,  but  low 
  India  Yes  3 7 Up,  but  low 
  United  States  Yes  16 12 Well  down 
  China  93  24  Well down, but still high 
 EU-15   8  14  Up 
  World    26 14 Well  down 
  World, exc. China  12  12  Unchanged 
Rice China  Moderate  70 29 Well  down 
  India  Yes  18 13 Down 
 Pakistan  Yes  19  8  Well  down 
 Thailand  Yes  7  13  Up 
  United  States  Yes  15 14 Same 
  Vietnam  Yes  2 7 Up,  but  low 
  EU-15    22 37 Up 
  World    33 17 Well  down 
  World, exc. China  14  13  Largely unchanged, but low 
Wheat  Pakistan  No  17 11 Down,  below  "optimum" 
  Argentina  Yes  4 3 Always  low 
  Australia  Yes  20 35 Up 
  Canada  Yes  32 24 Down,  but  still  high 
  EU-15  Yes  16 11 Down,  below  "optimum" 
 India  Yes  13  6  Down,  below  "optimum" 
  Kazakhstan  Yes  23 14 Down 
 Russia  Yes  16  7  Down,  below  "optimum" 
  Ukraine  Yes  23 11 Down 
  United States  Yes  27  21  Down, but still high 
 China  71  38 
Well down, but still very 
high 
  World  Yes  27 18 Down,  but  still  “optimum” 
  World, exc. China  19  14  Down, below "optimum" 




Table A.2. Dependency on US imports and exchange rate appreciation 
Region  US wheat imports  
(% consumption) 
US corn imports  
(% consumption) 
Real appreciation 
against USD:  




Middle East & N. Africa 2  15  20  15.0 
Caribbean 28 36 15  3.5 
Dominican Rep.  46  49  12  2.6 
Haiti 26  n.a.  5
a 3 
Trinidad & Tobago  48  95  18  NA 
Jamaica   26  100  15  4.1 
Central America 45  24  10  3.5 
Costa Rica  55  47  10   
El Salvador  31  21  8  3.2 
Guatemala 46 20  26  4.1 
Honduras 45  21  12 3.5 
Mexico 20  13  -2  3.7 
Nicaragua 46  9 4  1.7 
Panama 44  80  0 4.1 
South America 4  1  25  8.7 
Colombia 23  31  41  6.3 
Ecuador 9  23  8 2.5 
Peru 9  6  20  15.5 
Venezuela 27  22  -12 NA 
Sub-Saharan Africa 10  0  40  7.0   
SSA non-oil        5.0 
Ghana 10  0  35  2.2 
Nigeria 42  0  42  20.6 
East Asia 2 7 1  NA 
Hong Kong  1  49  -21  NA 
Japan 26  90  2  NA 
Korea, Rep.  16  28  15  NA 
South Asia 0.3 0.4  22  5.6  (4.0)
b 
Southeast Asia 12  1  25  6.0 
Thailand 19  0  30 7.1 
Philippines 32 0  29  6.3 
Source: Authors calculations based on USDA data (2008c) for imports and IMF’s (2008b) exchange rate data. 
Notes: 
aOnly the nominal exchange rate is reported for Haiti because of missing inflation data.  
bThis is the average after India is excluded. 23 
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